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The aim of this paper IS to demonst 回tethat an adapllve learning rule can lead the 
economic system to perfect foresight (or rational expectallons) eqmlibnum in a 
Samuelson-type overlappmg generallons model of a monetary economy. 
1 Introduction 
Research qu叫 io田凹帥ilityof perfect foresight (or rational叫 ectatio吋
equilibria, what is called e坦pectαtianalstabilityαs a equilibrium selection cri-
teπon, are asked increasingly often in the recent literature, such as whether 
simple阻 dplausible learning r叫田 existthat do converge to perfect fore-
sight equilibria under general conditions, and moreover, whether such learn-
ing rules c皿 singleo凶 aperfect foresight equilibrium, conesponding to a 
monetary steady state. Over the last few decades a large number of stud-
i田 havebeen made on expectational stability, originally proposed by D争
回 io( 1979), Friedm姐（1979）出Lucas・(1978), and e訪問sivelydeveloped 
by Bray (1982), Bray and Savin (1986), Eva血（1983,1985,1986, 1989），阻d
Evans田 d:fro血 pohja(1994a)1. 
In this paper attention is focused on stability of perfect for.田ightequilibria 
with adaptive learning叫田（oradaptive位 pectations)in a Samuelson-type 
overlapping generations model of皿.onetaryeconomy. Adaptive learning rules 
in overlapping generatio田 modelshave been studied often in the literature 
on learning. See Luc坦（1986),Gu田nerie副 Woodford(1991), and Ev山
田 dH。nkapohja(1995). Lucas (1986) is組問lyexample of the叫 ysisof 
adaptive learni且E出 away of selecting amongぬemultiple possible equilibria 
in阻 overlappinggenerations model. He has suggested tha色theoutcome of 
担 adaptivelearning proc由sin the overlapping generations血odelwill be a 
perfect foresight equilibrium, 
The aim of this paper is to de田.onstrateLucas’s conjecture Our main 
result is that回 adaptivelearning rule leads the economy to the perfect foreト
sight equilibrium, pr ovided that there are two steady stat田， coπespondmg
to the perfect foresight equilibriurn2, and the au七archysteady state, corre-
sponding to no exchange between generatio：田・ Forsimplicity we will cal 
ぬestationary perfect foresight equilibrium the perfect foresight e屯uilibrium 
below. 
'In h田町dynamiceconomic models the isue of conv町-genceof least squared learnings 
to国 ionalexpectations叩 ilib出 hasbeen studied by Marcet and Sargent (1988,1989). 
On the other hand lea而 ngm nonlinear models h箇 b目nc叩 sideredby Bullard (194), 
E百回andHonl喧.pohja(1994b,1995), Fu也（1979),Grand血叫 {1985),Grandmont and 
Laroque (1986,1990,1991), Woodford (1990), Guesn田ieand Woodford (1991），回dKaizoji 
(1994). 
2The st田dys回teis often caled the stationary mone同i:y向日ilibrium
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2 The model 
τ'he model involves .one non-storable good阻 da fiat money, that is employed 
for transferring wealth from one period to the next.τ'he money stock, M 
will be assumed to be constant over time. The model do田 notbequest. For 
simplicity, production is taken to be exogeno田.Agents live two periods and 
are identical ( equi叫 entlythere is a single agent) in each generation. The 
agents' endowments of the good at each ager= 1, 2, are lj > 0,l2 > 0.The 
agent’s t田t自由nongconsumption stre出国 α1~0， α2 ~ 0 are described by 
色heseparable utility function Vi （α1) + ¥/2（向）．
明月eshall z坦sume田 follows: 
Assumption 1 : For each r = 1, 2, VT（α.， ) iscontinuous on [O, +co) 
阻 dtwice continuo田 lydifD町田tiableon (0,+co). M町 eover,v;(aT) > 0, 
V，＇.（αT) < 0 forαT’回dlim.,.-o I午（叫＝+co, lima,-+oo v；（αγ） = 0. 
We focus on the Samuelson c由民 thatis, 
Assumption 2: 0 = V{(lj)/V,i(l2) < 1.
Let田 definethe so-called A庁O凹－Pra詑relαtived里greeof iisk aversion出
品（αT)= -V;1（αγ）αγ／I々（αT)which are well defined wheneverαγ ＞ 0. We 
shall田ethe following田sumption
Assumption 3・R仇） is a nondecreasi且gfunction ofα， for問 ryα2> 0.
Under the foregoing environment we c担民主 thewell-defined difference 
e屯uatio耳thatrepresentsぬelaw of motion of the economic system 
V{(l：一向）μ， = Vi (l; + μi+1)μi+1’ 
）??（?
where 的阻dμf+1 deno白血ereal balances and the real balances町 pected
by the young a居ent,respectively. 
立問write叫（的）＝μ川（l；一向）阻.clV2(1'f+1) = /L~＋ I V;(lz + !'f+i), then 
/Lt= v[1[t!2(1'i+ill = x(1Li+1l・ (2) 
The function x(μ) is continuously differentiable叩 theopen interval (0, +co). 
We s田 thatv1 is a differentiably increasing function that maps the inter:val 
(0, li) onto (0, +oc), while V2 maps (0, +oo) into itself. One has x（』≪） for al 
〆三0.If Pt = sup R2（匂）壬 1,x（〆） is increasing everywhere, while x（〆）
has a unique maximum under Assumption 3 when P2 > 1.Therefore under 
Assumptions 1,2 and 8 there isαunique perfect foresight equilibrium〆.For 
fu地 erdetails see Grandmont (1985). 
2.1 Adaptive Learning Dynamics 
We have a dynamic system where the目pectationsdete白血ethe current 
variables through equation ( 2).In order to define the dynami団組ly,we 
need to specify the expectations formation function. If agents do know at the 
beginning ofぬedate t only the current担 dp出色valuesof the real balances, 
(μ, ('t-[, μ,_2，….. ),then yo阻 gagents have to forecast the future val問。fthe real balance by田ingthe current阻 dp出色valu田 ofthe real balances 
at the beginning of the date t. One way to model expectations formation 
is to postulate白血Grandmont田 dLaroque (19お）， that at each date, the 
r叫 balan但 μf+1 expected by young a医師forec出tat the beginning of the 
date t isa伝edfunction of the curre凶 andp田t四 lu田 ofthe real balance 




















µf+i ＝µ~＋ 白［flt 一，，n, Oく白＜ 1. (3) 
where白tsa constant of proportionality called the expectatio田 coefficient.
With the adaptive learning rule (3), expectation is revised acoording匂 the
gap between previous expectations岨 d児alizaもio且s.Substituting (2）皿旬
( 3),we get the following 
μ；十l= (1 -C<)ft~ 十日χ（µf+1l· (4) 
The difference equations ( 2）担d(4) define a tempor町 monetarye中i-
libriu皿 dyna皿i田 withadaptive expectations, tha七is,adaptive learning dy-
na：宵ics.
Stobi;ty。fPod<et Fo",;ght Eq"ilibti• with Ad•p•ivc Lo>mi"g R"I" 69 
LemmαI : Under Assumptions l阻 d2, a steady state in adaptive learn-
ing dynami田 isequal to '.-per£』ctfor由ightequilibrium. 
Proof: If a steady sta旬。fthe equation (2) is equal to a steady state of 
the difference equation ( 4),then Le田皿a1 isproved. The proof is出血ediate.
百 eperfect fa悶 ghtequilibrium satisfies. the equation μ・－x（〆）= 0.百四
the equation (4) also becomes the steady state µ~+1 = µ~・ Th田 the above 
statement is proved. (Q.E.D.) 
We will i町田tigatethe properties of the forward temporary equilibrium 
dynami田 inSection 3 below. 
3 Stability of Perfect Foresight Equilibria 
In the present section we study stability for a perfect foresight equilibrium 
in adaptive ]earning d戸出国which町eg四 eratedby the叩 ations(2）副
(4). 
For co即日間of問中iswe re吋 te(4）田follows: 
F（µ~＋ l> 』，n 三 µ~＋ 1 - ax （µ~+l) －〔1 一白）µ~ = 0. (5) 
Since the function x(μ1ri) is continuously di!fere且tiableon the open inter-
val (0, +oo), F(μ;, μ；十ilh出 continuouspartial de巾ativ田 ona田 ighborhood
of an equilibrium （μぺ〆）at which F（μ＂，〆）＝。国dFl'l＋，（〆，μ’）f. 0 where 
Fµ~＋＞ denotes 8F／δμ1+i ・ Under the above con占tjo田 wecan apply the im-
plidtんnctiontheorem to the form F(μi,μi+i) = 0.τ'he implicit function 
th回目皿山testhat if F is田 ooth阻 dif a equ.ilib出血 point,（〆，μ＂）， is a 
point at which F1，~＋＞ do白 notvanish, then it is possible to expr白sμ九1坦 a
h且ctionof μi in a region containing the e吐出libriumpoi凶.In other words 
we can define forward adaptive learning dyn副団μf+i= g(Jtf) in a region 
contai且hg the equilibrium point, （〆，〆）.Further皿ore,the derivative of g 
is given py the implicit differentiation formula3 : 
3Tarui (1991) h田 originallyporn！吋outthat (6) is a condition of a local stabil均 for
a steady state. 
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F1,i（μ，ヘμつ
g'(t') = －－－－＝一一一凡1+1（μ，ぺμ・）． (6) 
From the foregoing analysis we can derive the following 
Theorem 1 : I且tp,• be the perfect foresight equilibrium which has the 
least value回 iongthe multiple possible equilibria. If Ass1皿 ption1田 d2
hold, then the perfect for田ightequilibriu血 Fis locally sta,ble. 
Proof : we get the following 
旦虫ヨユ (1一白）g'（的＝一 ＝一一一一ーF,'f+i (/1'. fi,') 1一日X’（wr (7) 
Since x’（P,') is always less th阻 1in the S阻 uelsonc田町g'(P,')is always 
les than 1. This mea田 thatforward adaptive learning dynamics /LZ+i = 
g(μ,f) are locally 討able.It folio明世omLemma 1 that p,• is locally stable. 
(Q.E.D.) 
Next we look at a condition of global stability of a pe1fect foresight equi-
libriu皿．
Theorem 2 : IfAssumptions 1, 2阻 d3 hold, the unique perfect foresight 
equilibrium μ念 thatis globally stable exists. 
Proof: We define the following 
f= ~／Li＋ 一一三－x(µi")= f(tinl・ (B) (1一日） 1 (1一日） ト
Since /(μf+1) iscontinuous and monotonically increasing, or /(μf+1) h出 a
single凶回mum叫 ue,it folio明 thatthe map f (μT+ 1) is a con ti叫 ous阻 d
血onotonkallyincreasing function which h出血intervalI = ［α，bJ for dom血
whereαis a p田iti四 valueof f(μT+1) = 0，岨dh田 r岨geJ = [O,d]. Iもis
possible that b阻 cld町einfinite. (See Figur田 1and 2.) Then, there is the 
inve回efu且ctiung(μi) of /(1tf+1), （もhatis, /Lf+1 = g(ti) with domain J. 
Since the map f has the unique perfect for悶ghtequilibrium〆，fsatisfies 
the following 
Condition 1 
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J(O) = 0, 
f(tLi; ；）くJLi1I 
f(JLi; 1l> JLi; I 
f(JL•) = JL•, 
for αく ／Li;iくμヘ
for JL＇くJLiI 1くb.
Therefore the inve田efunction g satisfies the following conditions 
Condition 2 
9(0) = 0, 
g(JLi) > /Li 
g(JLi) < JLi 
g(Jt') = /L・，
forα ＜ JLZ < JL', 
for 〆く／Li< d.
It folio明 fromCondition 2 that g(1in is a contraction mapping on /l 1 
(See Figure 3.) Thus a perfect foresight equilibrium JL' is globally stable from 
the contraction mapping theorem. (Q.E.D.) 
3.1 Example 
Suppose that the utility function for each generation is given by 
に（α，）＝αi吋，）/(1ール）， T = 1,2. (9) 
The utility function (12) satisfies Asumptions 1, 2 and 3. Therefore the問
exists a unique perfect foresight equilibrium μへAsit concerns the atitude to 
risk, the function is known出 C叩 st叫目lativerisk aversion (CRRA), whe児
the RRA coefficient is -V～（』）／V’（ατ）= (3，・脱出sumethatβ1=1叩 d
β2 > 1.Then F(tLi+ 1, JLiJ is出おllows: 




Since /L'(l + {32(/i + 11•)/i, 1 /lj> 0, we get g1(1＇）く 1.The foregoing result 
prove that a perfect foresight equilibrium is locally stable. 
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For analysis of the global stability of /l' we rewri民（13)as follows : 
l~ ＝向／lZ1I一向1;,z,;r,J.z, + （川 (12) 
The function f(p.i t 1) is continuous nnd has a single minimum value. Further-
more f(/L~11) satisfies Conditions I and 2. The目fo問 itfol19ws from Theo閃田
2 that μ命 isgrobally stable. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we demonstrate that adaptive expectations always lead the 
dynamic system to the perfect for田ightequilibna in a Samuelson-type over 
lapping generations model of a monetary economy Once五orwar<ladaptive 
learning dyno.mi白 convergeto a perfect foresight equilib1ium, a generation's 
learning becomes complete, so that the generation h田 perfectforesight New 
genero.tio田 whoru官 bornsubsequently face the situation that 1s exactly the 
same, in al r・espects，田 thatfaced by the preceding generation. Thus they 
also have perfect foresight. This conclusion is independent of the agent's de-
gree of risk aversion. It is known fr。立1Benhabib and Day (1982）’and Gran 
m。nt(1985）’and other authors that ba伽 arddynami田 maybe chaotic, p昨
vided that agents have perfect foresigl北（thatis, /'i・I 1 = /Li）皿da児 veryrisk 
町田'Se.Consider the const臼 telasticity case, that is, Vr("・r) ＝ α~－fl. /(1ーん）
once again. Backwεu・d perfect foresight dynruni明白echaotic rn the se出 eof 
Li目Yorke，出 theCorollary of Grandmont (1985) demonstrates, when /J2 is 
lru・ge enough provided that the other conditions are constant. On the con-
trary we c叩 illustratethat the lru・ger the old generation's RRA coefficient, 
/J2 becomes, the more rapidly forward adaptive learning dynarni田 converge
to the perfect foresight equilibrium. To put it another way, the more the old 
generation becomes risk averse, the more rapidly the learning is complete. 
On these grounds we have come to the conclusion that an agent"s adaptive 
behavior does lead to perfect foresight (or rati。nalexpectati。n
under general conditions, and therefore there is considerable JUSti五cationfor 
the出sumptionof r叫icmalexpectations in the long run. 
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貨幣を含む効用関数モデルにおける適応的学習ルールと
完全予見均衡の安定性
海蔵寺大成
最近，様々な経済モデルからカオスが発生することが報告されている。
福田（1993）は効用関数が貨幣を含む動的最適化モデルからカオスが発生
することを示した．
本稿では，福田モデルを用いて，経済主体が将来の価格水準について適
応的学習を行う場合，経済時系列のカオスは学習によって安定化し，経済
均衡に収束することを証明する．
本稿の結果は，経済主体が，適切な学習を行えば，長期的には経済変動
は安定化することを示している。
